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Envisioning a Modern Federal-State Partnership in the Reauthorization of 
the HEA as an Engine to Increase Social Mobility 




Financial aid makes up the bulk of federal higher education spending, but do those dollars make a 
difference to needy students? A look at Federal Work-Study and Federal Supplemental Educational 
Opportunity Grant allocations show that a disproportionate amount of funding goes to private 
universities with high tuition and low Federal Pell Grant enrollment. Additionally, many financial 
aid awards use cost of attendance as a factor in determining award amounts, creating an 
unintentional incentive for tuition increases. These elements contribute to a funding environment 
that favors private universities over publics. When considered alongside the fact that pervasive state 
disinvestment has caused public colleges and universities to raise their tuition considerably over 
the last decade alone, the existence of public higher education appears to be in jeopardy. The 
authors propose a federal-state partnership that would incentivize state governments to maintain or 
increase their funding for public higher education. Further suggestions include the elimination of 
price-sensitive components in financial aid awards and maintaining caps on these awards to stem 
tuition increases where possible. 
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he U.S. Senate Committee on Healthcare, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) held a hearing on 
the issue of affordability in higher education in March 2015. Whereas many previous hearings on the 
topic during the last decade and a half focused on increasing federal direct student aid or expanding 
student loan maximums, this one approached it from a different angle: ending state disinvestment. Dialogue 
in this hearing concentrated primarily on stopping states from the widespread fiscal disinvestment that has 
been going on for decades in the United States. This disinvestment is counted by many sources—including 
the Center for American Progress (Baylor, 2014), Demos (Hiltonsmith, 2015), and the Association of Public 
& Land Grant Universities (APLU) (Johnson & Yanaguiura, 2015)—as the primary reason for our nation’s 
rapid tuition and fee escalation in the public sector. Both in testimony and during the hearing’s question-
and-answer period, senators from the right and the left expressed significant concern, stating that we cannot 
continue to pour federal resources into direct student aid as a means of offsetting what states cut from their 
public higher education systems.  
 
State disinvestment in higher education is a critical challenge currently facing postsecondary education. 
Moreover, it is one of the greatest challenges facing our emerging and current students, who will need more 
and more federal student aid to offset the ever-decreasing affordability that will accompany any future state 
reductions. This article proposes a new federal-state partnership that incentivizes states to maintain 
affordability for their public colleges and universities while ensuring that federal student aid does not simply 
supplant state disinvestment. The article also offers examples of similar governmental policy reforms that 
have a strong record of success.  
 
 
F. King Alexander is president of Louisiana State University. Ashley Arceneaux is director of presidential and policy communications for 
Louisiana State University. 
T 
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Student aid has its roots in the ideal of access to higher education for all academically qualified students 
who wish to participate, regardless of their financial resources, and the goal of not only keeping the 
American Dream attainable, but also affordable. Without financial aid, academically capable students from 
lower-income families would be constrained to their existing socioeconomic status, making America’s 
society rigid and caste-like. 
 
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA)—the most 
expansive and promising U.S. higher education legislation ever proposed—he envisioned a country of 
greater access to postsecondary education gained primarily through direct student aid. Johnson’s student aid 
movement played into his larger, all-encompassing “war on poverty.” HEA included Title IV, which 
focused on the administration and distribution of financial assistance to students demonstrating financial 
need. The vision? Everyone would have the chance to work hard, earn a degree, and enjoy the social 
mobility attached to educational attainment. The end result? A healthier economy, a more economically 
competitive country, and a happier, more socially responsible citizenry—or so the nation believed.  At that 
moment, the United States stood on the cusp of the promise of educational transformation that would have 
worldwide significance. 
 
But somewhere between the promise of 1965 and the reality of today, something has gone off track. 
Federal dollars are still being spent on higher education—with a majority allocated to financial aid for 
students—but the outcomes are worrisome. Reed and Cochrane (2014) show that roughly 7 in 10 graduates 
have debt (primarily federal student loans) with the average level of indebtedness hovering near $30,000. 
Overall, student debt was $1.2 trillion in 2015—surpassing even credit card debt and second only to 
mortgage loans (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2015). Meanwhile, attainment gaps between the 
wealthiest and lowest-income students are large. Mortenson (2012) demonstrates that 71% of children from 
high-income households complete a bachelor’s degree, compared with only 6 to 10% of the poorest 
students. According to Ratcliffe and McKernan (2013), one-third of student loan borrowers never earned 
their degrees, placing them in an even more precarious position than when they started.1 
 
Our nation’s higher education system is not working as promised. It is no wonder that, according to a 
2010 report from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United 
States’ social mobility ranking is near the bottom relative to all other OECD countries. In fact, the report 
shows that not only have our social mobility rankings fallen, but we also now rank 12th in college 
completion rates among those aged 25 to 34 years, and, if we do not do anything to alter this trend, we will 
drop to 19th in the next decade (OECD, 2010).  This is not the future we envisioned for student aid and 
our nation. We must significantly change the way we fund public higher education and allocate financial aid 
in this country so that the next 50 years offer the access and opportunity promised by the original HEA. 
 
 
The Financial Aid Problem 
 
The problem starts with our current approach to funding higher education, which allows financial aid 
dollars to flow to the university with no evaluation of the mission of the institution or the outcomes it 
produces. The current approach also funds public, not-for-profit and for-profit private institutions with vast 
amounts of public taxpayer dollars by inflating need as cost of attendance increases. This approach keeps 
already wealthy, mission-blind private universities flush with cash flowing in from the federal government 
and leaves public, mission-serving universities that charge lower tuition with little in the way of funds. As we 
will show, without building meaningful approaches that ensure federal financial aid dollars support students 
with real financial need, not need falsely created by astronomical tuition, we will not only fail to provide 
access to all students, but we will also see the end of public higher education in many states across the 
nation. 
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This lack of oversight in funding has a direct impact on the efficacy of federal student aid. Campus-based 
student aid such as Federal Work Study (FWS) and Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant 
(FSEOG) illustrate the inequities in current aid distribution. While meant to benefit low-income students, 
these programs allocate funds in a price-sensitive manner that benefits high-cost private institutions over 
more affordable publics, thereby diminishing the positive impact they could have on larger populations of 
underprivileged students. In short, universities that charge more in tuition receive more federal money 
simply because of their price tag, not because of the quality they offer or the populations they serve. 
 
The U.S. Department of Education currently maintains three sets of allocation rules for campus-based 
aid, as indicated in the United States Code Annotated Title 20: Chapter 28 and Title 43: Chapter 34. One is 
for universities and colleges that participated in federal campus-based FWS, FSEOG, and Federal Perkins 
Loans prior to or during the 1999-2000 award year. The second is for those that began participation after 
that period but are not first- or second-time participants, and the third is for first- and second-time 
participants. Institutions falling into the first category receive 100% of their FY99 levels in what is referred 
to as a “base guarantee.” In addition, they receive a “fair share increase” equal to the sum of aid provided 
through the Federal Pell Grant, Academic Competitiveness Grant (ACG), National Science and 
Mathematics Access to Retain Talent (SMART) Grant, and Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnership 
(LEAP) Grant subtracted from the cost of attendance and estimated family contribution of a representative 
sample of undergraduates at the institution. 
 
Colleges and universities falling into the second award tier receive a base guarantee of whichever is 
greatest: 90% of the funds received in their second year of participation, or $5,000. And those in the third 
tier receive the greater of $5,000, 90% of an amount proportional to that received by comparable 
institutions, or 90% of what the institution received in its first year of participation. 
 
Although the fair share concept takes into account students’ financial need, much of that need is 
calculated against the price of tuition (Smole, 2012). As such, the formula provides greater aid per student to 
the institutions that charge the highest tuition. The formula also distributes the majority of federal funds for 
these critical programs in the same mission- and outcomes-blind approach as it always has—based on 
historical allocations, not in a way that addresses real student need. Once a base guarantee is set, there is no 
further evaluation of an institution’s allocation, unless it is to allocate an additional “fair share” amount.  
 
The implications of this approach speak for themselves. Data from the National Association of Student 
Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA) Campus-based Aid Allocation Task Force (2014) show that in the 
FWS program in 2013-14, eight Ivy League campuses received nearly twice as much funding as the entire 
California State University System, which represents 23 comprehensive state universities. This outcome is 
particularly problematic when you consider that the eight Ivy League campuses have about 112,000 total 
students and fewer than 10,000 Pell Grant recipients or lower-income students (IPEDS, 2015). By 
comparison, the California State University System has approximately 460,000 students and nearly 200,000 
Pell Grant or lower-income students (IPEDS, 2015).  
 
The NASFAA data (2014) also show that, in 2013-14, Harvard received $1.3 million in FSEOG funding, 
Northwestern University received $2.1 million, and Princeton University received $1 million. Yet the same 
data shows some public flagship universities that served four to five times as many low-income students 
during the same period received considerably lower FSEOG allocations. For instance, in 2013-14, the 
University of Tennessee received $500,000, the University of Kentucky received $450,000, and Louisiana 
State University received $350,000. 
 
This pattern also holds true for FWS dollars. The same NASFAA report (2014) shows that in 2013-14 
Harvard received $3.7 million, Georgetown received $2.3 million, and Yale received $1.7 million. Schools 
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serving many more students received considerably lower aggregate amounts. For example, California State 
University, Long Beach received $1.2 million, Louisiana State University received $920,000, and Auburn 
University received $900,000 (NASFAA, 2014). 
 
If FWS and FSEOG formulas were reworked to award the greatest amounts of aid to the institutions 
that served the greatest numbers of students, the programs could make a real difference for many of our 
underprivileged and underrepresented students. As recommended by Kelchen (2014), allocations based on 
any number of metrics (e.g., the number of Pell recipients a university serves) would produce better and 
more immediate results. 
 
The unintended negative consequences of current approaches to allocating federal campus-based aid are 
mirrored at the state level through state-based “tuition equalization” programs. These programs promise to 
pay the difference between public university tuition and private tuition within a particular state, for the 
stated purpose of increasing access for low income students. However, tuition equalization programs 
essentially incentivize private not-for-profit and for-profit institutions to inflate pricing. Perhaps the most 
egregious example of this problem is the state of California’s Cal Grant A program. In 2012, it was 
discovered, after many years of state student aid funding, that the average award from this program ranged 
from about $5,000 for California State University students to an average of $9,000 to $13,000 for students 
attending higher-priced private and for-profit institutions. This approach not only rewarded institutions for 
charging higher prices but also included no checks on the quality of education students received.  
 
For-profit institutions, certainly the most nimble group within higher education, not only received larger 
state student aid grants in places like California, but some also adapt their business models to exploit dollars 
available through Pell, veterans benefits, and federal student loans. Mettler (2014) demonstrates the 
aggressive marketing and recruiting for-profit institutions engaged in to capitalize on Post-9/11 GI Bill 
dollars. In fact, while the government intended to limit the ability of these institutions to gain more than 
90% of their profits from federal dollars, the 90/10 rule, which requires for-profits to generate at least 10% 
of their profits through sources other than federal aid, only applies to Title IV funds, not veteran- or 
military-specific monies. Mettler (2014) gives the following breakdown of where things stand now: For-
profit institutions enroll only 11% of the nation’s student population (with a disproportionately high 
number of African Americans) but acquire nearly 30% of all Pell Grants, $1 of every $4 in Title IV dollars, 
and 37% of all available GI Bill benefits, and register approximately 47% of all student loan defaults. In 
short, 86% of for-profit revenue comes from public funds. Nationwide, approximately 34 cents of state 
student aid dollars flows to private universities (Mettler 2014).  
 
 
The State Problem 
 
Johnson and Yanagiura (2015) found that four-year public universities experienced state funding cuts of 
$2,370 per student from 2006-07 to 2012-13, but increased tuition and fee revenues by only $1,940. While 
that represents a net loss of $430 per full-time student, public universities increased their per FTE 
educational expenditures by $528 during this same period. The math in this equation is simply 
unsustainable—something has to change, and soon. This report caused the Association of Public and Land 
Grant Universities (APLU) to issue a statement on August 27, 2015, expressing significant concern about 
the country’s ability to meet its goal of having 60% of American adults attain a postsecondary degree 
without a change in state support of public higher education.  
 
We cannot address these escalating costs driven by state disinvestment with “band-aids” as we have for 
so many decades. It makes little sense to increase a Pell Grant award by $200 or $300 when state funding 
reductions force public institutions to increase tuition and fees by $600 to $900 per year. Continually 
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increasing the flow of federal funding as states abandon their funding commitments is not sustainable. The 
persistent refusal to enact policy change has resulted in institutional Darwinism (Alexander, 2008) 
manifested by institutions maximizing their prestige through vehicles like U.S. News and World Report, or, in 
the case of for-profit institutions, shareholder profits. 
 
To succeed in the vision originally set forth through the original HEA and to ensure that affordable 
public colleges and universities are still available in the future, we need to develop a new federal-state 
partnership that incentivizes states to stabilize and increase their funding to public colleges and universities. 
As demonstrated by Mortenson (2015), since 1980, our country has witnessed an unprecedented 
disinvestment in higher education by its states. Public universities first began to increase tuition as a matter 
of survival, as states saw the increase in federal student aid funding as an opportunity to begin decreasing 
their financial commitments to colleges and universities (Alexander, 2001). This fiscal supplanting became 
more habitual than intended, as shown when Hiltonsmith (2015) of Demos demonstrated that declining 
state support caused 80% of net tuition increases at public universities from 2001-11.2 Other recent studies 
have also shown that state funding levels are not only below pre-recession levels, but are also lower than in 
1966 (Mitchell, et. al, 2014; Mortenson 2015).3 
 
Based on data reported by Mortenson (2015), if a federal-state partnership cannot be forged to 
incentivize or match increased state funding to public institutions, Colorado will be the first state to 
completely stop funding its public higher education systems in 2025—only ten years away. As a result, 
children currently in Colorado’s elementary schools will not have the option of attending a public college or 
university. Additional states that will soon follow Colorado in abandoning all their public higher education 
investments include Louisiana in 2027, Massachusetts and Rhode Island in 2029, Arizona in 2030, South 
Carolina in 2031, Vermont in 2032, Oregon in 2034, and Wisconsin, Minnesota, New York, and Montana in 
2036 (Mortenson 2015). 
 
History is replete with examples of effective federal-state partnerships in higher education in the United 
States. Perhaps the greatest example is the Morrill Act or Land-Grant Act of 1862. This Act gave federal 
lands to state governments throughout the U.S. in exchange for the creation of new public colleges and 
universities that produced more engineers, agricultural scientists, and military science graduates. This 
federal-state partnership could arguably be considered the foundation of what led the U.S. to become the 
world’s leader in higher education development a century later. The success of the Morrill Act also led to the 
creation of the second Morrill Act in 1890, which required each state from the former Confederacy to 
designate a separate land-grant institution for persons of color. 
 
More recently, federal leverage was used again with the passage of the 1972 HEA reauthorization 
through the creation of the State Student Aid Incentive Grant (SSIG), later renamed the LEAP program. 
This federal matching program encouraged states to create state need-based student aid programs or 
increase funding to existing ones. In creating SSIG, the federal government sent a clear message to states to 
either reallocate funds to begin supporting these programs or match additional state funding to these grant 
programs. The federal matching funds proved extremely effective and encouraged 20 additional states to 
adopt state student aid programs within four years. These examples illustrate the power of federal matching 
programs for incentivizing state funding behavior.  
 
Further evidence of the effectiveness of federal leverage can be found in the reauthorization efforts of 
the Higher Education Act in 2007, when lawmakers added the first “maintenance of effort” (MOE) 
provision to protect higher education from dramatic cuts. In 2008 and 2009, Congress transferred the same 
MOE language into the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which allowed states to use 
education stimulus funds only if they did not reduce their higher education budgets below 2006 state 
funding levels (Alexander, Harnish, Hurley, & Moran 2010). As might be expected, a few months after 
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Congress passed the MOE, a critical mass of states began to cut their higher education budgets to the very 
edge of where federal penalties would apply. The federal leverage worked well as few states crossed the 
federal line, ultimately stemming the mass state disinvestment trend across the nation. 
 
Drawing from these examples, Congress should consider a number of initiatives in the current 
reauthorization. First, federal student aid programs, including subsidized student loan programs, should 
eliminate or reduce “price sensitivity” factors such as cost of attendance from funding formulas. Second, 
federal student aid loan limits and caps should be maintained. As shown by Lucca, Nadauld, and Shen 
(2015), when federal student aid loan limits are increased, it may incentivize institutions to increase their 
tuition and fees. One example of this pattern was the Middle Income Assistance Act of 1978, which 
expanded loan availability to middle- and upper-income students. This expansion was followed in later years 
by increased loan caps. Following these actions, student loan debt increased rapidly, as did student tuition 
and fees.  
 
Third and most importantly, before we further increase federal student aid awards or expand federal 
student loan caps, we need to ensure that states do not continue disinvesting in their public higher education 
institutions. A new federal-state partnership is a critical foundational element of our HEA reforms.  
 
With this reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, our country once again stands poised to enact 
real change in student aid and higher education funding, but creating this change will take the courage to 
explore new federal policy directives and break from previous failed policies. The stakes of failing to act are 
too large; we cannot allow our underrepresented student populations to continue to be disadvantaged or 
watch this nation’s great public higher education enterprise vanish from the nation’s landscape. We have 
already let damage accrue for fifty years—our children cannot afford to sit out the next fifty. The path 
forward is clear: a federal-state partnership is not new to federal policy. Federal-state partnerships have not 
only worked in higher education, but also with Medicaid and our nation’s highways. It is time that we make 









1. Studies (e.g., Carnevale, Cheah, & Hanson, 2015) have repeatedly shown that those without a degree earn 
approximately $1 million less over the course of a lifetime than those with a degree. These imbalances affect 
a disproportionate share of minorities. According to Ratcliffe and McKernan (2013), African Americans and 
Hispanics are nearly twice as likely as Caucasians to have student loan debt, yet reports from the Education 
Trust (Nguyen, Bibo, & Engle, 2012a, 2012b) have shown that the degree-attainment rate for Caucasians 
aged 25-29 is 40%, while degree-attainment rates for African Americans hover at around 20%, and Hispanic 
degree-attainment rates are only one-third that of Caucasians.  
2. Additionally, Mortenson (2015) shows that state funding for higher education (as measured by state tax 
effort) is approximately 50% lower than in 1981. State tax effort measures state spending as a percentage of 
higher education support by state per capita income.   
3. Mortenson’s analysis uses “Grapevine” state funding data from Illinois State University and compares 
state fiscal support for higher education per $1,000 of personal income from FY 1961 to FY 2015. 
(Mortenson, 2015).   
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